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less profitable, and accumulating capital more slowly than 
non-group firms. The emergence of the business groups was an 
outcome of entry into new profitable business fields by the 
existing companies given that exit from the old business fields 
was not easy due to institutional constraints. In this case, entry 
or expansion into new business fields was often accompanied by 
asset diversion from old to new business fields conducted by 
new spin-off firms, leading to the creation of hybrid parent 
companies. The net effect of this kind of asset diversion is 
dubious because it was associated with asset striping and/or 
information hiding from the supervisory state agency. These 
hybrid form business groups are characterized by low long-term 
investment ratio and low weight of business income of the 
parent companies.
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I. Introduction
There has been heated debate on the policy of promoting business 
groups in China as the successive collapse of several chaebols 
(conglomerates) in Korea since 1997 and during the followed 
financial crisis was witnessed. It was reported that the Chinese 
policy makers agreed upon the need to have group-style firms in a 
developing country such as China, but that they decided not to 
follow the unsuccessful precedent of the Korean chaebols, such as 
pursuing overly rapid growth and excessive diversification into 
unrelated business areas (Institute for Macroeconomy, PRC 1998; 
Lee and Woo 2002). The occurrence of business groups has emerged 
as one of the most important policy issues in China as many large 
scale companies take the form of such groups, transforming 
themselves from traditional state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) into 
modern joint-stock companies. As of 2003, eleven Chinese business 
groups were ranked in Fortune Global 500 enterprises (Hahn and 
Lee 2006, Appendix Table).
Granovetter (1995) defines business groups as collections of firms 
bound together in formal and/or informal ways, characterized by an 
intermediate level of binding, namely neither bound merely by short 
term strategic alliances nor legally consolidated into a single entity. 
The Chinese business groups seem to fit this definition, although 
they might be different in terms of strength of the personal and 
operational ties among the member or affiliate firms.1 The business 
group can be considered as one of the most recent experiments in a 
series of state enterprise reform experiments since the 1980s, which 
have sought to build different models of enterprise in China (Hahn 
and Lee 2006; Huchet 1997; McNally 1997; Keister 1998). The 
Chinese enterprise reform for large and medium-sized SOEs 
proceeded from the profit retention system initially, through the 
contract management system and joint-stock companies or modern 
corporations to, finally, the business groups (Lee 1993; Chen and 
Huang 1995; Han 1997).
Despite a series of reform efforts, a large proportion of SOEs are 
still losing money, while those that are profit-making tend to be 
converted into joint-stock companies and are no longer classified as 
1 This is how Strachan (1976) distinguishes the typical American 
conglomerate from the business groups.
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SOEs. Thus, dealing effectively with the inefficient SOEs has been 
one of the most critical issues facing the future of the Chinese 
economy (Lee and Hahn 2004). This paper focuses on business 
groups, because this is the front-line issue in enterprise reform in 
China. However, the focus of the paper is neither to analyze the 
condition of the current business groups in today’s China nor to 
suggest any policy solutions based on analysis of them.  The paper 
aims, instead, at providing a more theoretical interpretation of the 
emergence of diverse types of business groups in China. The early to 
mid 1990s was chosen as the ideal time to analyze because this 
period was the start of business groups in China. Although Keister’s 
(1998) study on the business groups in China goes back to the 
earlier period, such as the 1980s, the early to mid 1990s is the first 
time the business groups were listed on the stock markets and, 
therefore, there is more reliable data. To be precise, we are targeting 
the transformation of the traditional SOEs in a socialist economy 
into the business groups in a modern sense, therefore, the early to 
mid 1990s is the right time for such analysis.
We looked at diverse business groups in China during this period, 
with types ranging from production-oriented parent companies to 
pure holding companies, as well as more interesting types including 
hybrid form companies which lie somewhere between the above two 
extremes. We will argue that the emergence of the diverse forms of 
business groups was a response to the ever-tightening market 
competition in China. Further, we will argue that hybrid form groups 
emerged as enterprises tried to circumvent the constraints associated 
with the legacy of central planning by diverting assets to sub- 
sidiaries. Two important hypotheses we propose are that the 
traditional parent companies were converting to the hybrid form as 
their own business incomes were decreasing, and that many of the 
current hybrid form parent companies are actually similar in nature to 
pure holding companies.
The paper is organized as follows. In order to explain the 
emergence of the business groups in China, Section II examines the 
increasing market competition and discusses the expected or realized 
benefits from formation of the business groups. In Section III, we 
discuss the diverse paths leading toward groups and the basic 
characteristics of the business groups, such as ownership structure, 
debt ratios, profitability, and growth tendencies. In Section IV, we 
analyze the different types of business groups in China by using the 
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three-year data of more than 100 groups listed on stock markets. We 
focus on the hybrid form of the groups and the issue of asset 
diversion among firms in the group. The paper concludes with a 
summary in the last section.
II. Why the Business Group Emerged in China
The enterprise survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences in 1996 identifies the reasons for and benefits from the 
formation of business groups as follows (Hahn and Lee 2006). The 
primary three include: 1) to deal with the surplus workers; 2) to 
increase size by pooling capital; and 3) to use the existing resources 
more efficiently. The secondary reasons include: 4) to circumvent 
state interference; and 5) to promote managerial accountability and 
transparency.
These five factors leading to the formation of business groups can 
be understood in terms of an increasing need to cope with market 
competition. In other words, the ever-increasing market competition 
caused companies to experience, more heavily, the burden of surplus 
workers; and to recognize a strong need to achieve scale economy 
and more efficient resource utilization. Before we discuss this matter 
in more detail below, let us first document the increasing market 
competition in China.
A. Market Competition in China: Three Factors
Increasing market competition in China can be traced to three 
origins. First, strong new entry by private and FDI-backed firms 
contributed to increased market competition. Second, market- 
oriented reform since 1978 transformed the planned economy into a 
market economy, i.e. featuring excess supply rather than supply 
shortages as in the past. Third, market-driven integration of the 
domestic economy substantially reduced the notorious provincial 
protectionism. These three are interrelated, as discussed here. 
First, there is abundant evidence that increasing market 
competition in China is driven by the new and strong entry of 
private and FDI-backed foreign companies. The 1996 enterprise 
survey indicates that Chinese SOEs perceive rural enterprises 
(36.9%) and foreign companies (21.5%) as their main rivals. Only 
26.7% of the respondent SOEs identified other SOEs as their main 
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competitors. Competitive pressure from the heavy presence of foreign 
enterprises was real, with the share of foreign companies in total 
output and profit values of many secondary sectors as high as 30% 
or 40% (Lee and Woo 2002). Foreign share, especially, was higher 
than 40% in the five growth-leading industries: apparel and textiles, 
leather and fur, educational and sports goods, measurement and 
scientific instrument and office goods, and electronics and 
communication equipment.
Second, demand-constrained economy started to feature in the 
Chinese economy because of increasing supply and new entries. As 
is well argued by Kornai (1980), one of the most important 
distinctions between market and planned economies, is the contrast 
between the demand-constrained and resource or supply-constrained 
economy. This can be one clear-cut and simple criterion used 
assessing the progress toward a market-oriented economy. In China, 
the buyers’ market emerged as early as the mid-1980s with speeds 
dependant upon the type of industry (Byrd 1987). In the 1990s, the 
problem of excess supply was reported to be serious in a number of 
industries including textiles, consumer electronics, and some 
intermediate goods industries. In textiles, for example, excess 
capacity was estimated to be approximately 40% of the market 
demand. In electronics, the proportion of the number of items with 
excess supply had increased from 66.3% in 1995 to 75% in 1996 
(IIE, CASS 1997). As a result of this excess capacity, operating rates 
fell to serious levels; below 25% in PCs and film; around 30% in 
air-conditioning equipment, copying machines, and microwave ovens; 
around 40% in VCRs, washing machines, engines, automobiles, color 
TVs, paint; and around 50% in telephones, cooking oil, bicycles, 
auto-bikes, sugar, cameras (IIE, CASS 1997). Although this 
information regarding excess capacity is not directly from the data of 
the sample firms we are dealing with here, it is reasonable to 
observe that these conditions should have similarly affected the 
business groups and other firms in the same industries.
Third, the increasing degree of national economic integration has 
contributed to reducing regional protectionism. As reported in Hahn 
and Lee (2006), the 1996 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences survey 
found 76.4% of the firms of 681 firms which responded, answered 
affirmatively to the question “whether the competing products from 
other provinces can be sold freely in your regions.” In regard to the 
question asked about identifying major difficulties when trying to sell 
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products in other localities, only 24.9% of the 667 firms, singled out 
entry barriers from local governments as the major source of 
difficulty. The more major difficulties turned out to be ‘difficulty in 
getting relevant market information’ with this response claiming 
44.1% of the answers.
B. Expected or Realized Benefits from the Group Formation
The five benefits from group formation stated at the beginning of 
this section can be summed up as, firstly, more efficient utilization 
of existing resources and acquisition of lacked resources; and 
secondly, information manipulation from outsiders and better 
arrangement for internal incentives. The reasons stated above as 1), 
2), and 3) are related to the former benefit, while the reasons stated 
above as 1), 4), and 5) are related to the latter benefit.
According to Penrose’s (1959) view, the firm is a bundle of 
resources utilizing existing resources and acquiring lacking resources 
as the most critical matters determining the fate of firms. 
Diversification can also be interpreted as a better way to utilize 
existing resources when the firm has important resources locked into 
less profitable businesses and a more profitable use of resources 
emerges. In such a situation, it is natural for the firm to switch from 
old and less profitable to new more profitable lines of business with 
both existing and newly mobilized resources.
Given the Chinese context, with its legacy of a planned economy, 
exiting from existing lines of business is very difficult. Therefore, 
entry into a new business is more likely to take the form of setting 
up new subsidiaries. The new subsidiaries tend to be more joint 
ventures with other domestic or foreign partners with the effect of 
pooling new capital, technology or brand name. Thus, a positive 
purpose in setting up new ventures is to increase competitiveness 
associated with size or new inputs.
An additional benefit of setting up a new subsidiary rather than a 
new division when a firm considers diversification, can be discussed 
in terms of insider control problems and incentives (Lee and Hahn 
2004). The point is, there can be two opposing implications between 
managerial transparency and economic efficiency. With regard to 
outsiders being included by the supervisory state agencies, setting 
up another tier of enterprise in the form of subsidiaries tends to 
have the effect of information manipulation by adding more agency 
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tiers, making it easier to hide information from outsiders. On the 
other hand, from the intra-firm point of view, setting-up a new firm 
rather than a new division can provide strong incentives and higher 
managerial transparency. In an independent firm, the manager and 
workers in subsidiaries would have more incentives and feel a 
greater sense of responsibility, and would be subject to more 
transparent accounting.
In terms of Chinese enterprises, the first dimension of 
circumventing interference and monitoring from state bureaucrats 
would be more important than increasing worker accountability. As 
discussed in Section IV below, transition into the business groups 
often led to transformation into hybrid holding companies, which 
involved irregular diversion of the parent company’s resources to the 
benefit of subsidiaries. Such a diversion can also be a leeway for 
diverse types of expropriation of state property in the form of asset 
stripping, tax evasion, debt reductions and dividend manipulation. 
For example, Fan (1996) documents opportunistic cases of leaving 
profits with subsidiaries and leaving debts with parent companies.
The positive side is the fact that new subsidiaries set up by the 
parent companies can often provide a solution for surplus or retired 
worker problems. The authors know of a case where a paper- 
producing company in Shandong solved their retired worker problem 
by setting up a new service firm and sending these retired works to 
the new firm.2 This happened when the company was being turned 
into a joint venture with a foreign partner. The parent company 
promised limited five-year subsidies to this new firm to motivate the 
employees to work harder. Although individual company’s situations 
might be somewhat different to this example, many Chinese 
companies are reported to use newly established subsidiaries to deal 
with surplus workers.
In sum, the net efficiency effect of the business group and asset 
diversion in China is not certain. 
III. Basic Characteristics of the Business Groups
As discussed in Hahn and Lee (2006), three paths toward the 
business groups in China have been identified by a survey 
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, such as 
2
Information from a field work in Shandong in 1997.
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spin-offs, M&A, and joint ventures. The form most frequently 
adopted is the establishment of subsidiaries through spin-offs, which 
sometimes involves the establishment of new firms not only with 
money from the parent firm but also includes those with an 
investment from other independent companies. The latter case might 
well be called joint ventures. This is how we distinguish the two 
terms, spin-offs and joint ventures, in this paper.
First, we examine the basic characteristics of business groups in 
China. For this, we rely on our database consisting of data for both 
business groups and non-group firms listed on stock markets in 
China. This data is taken from the annual reports published in the 
January to May issues of Shaghai Zhengquanbao, Zhengquan Shibao, 
and Zhongguo Zhengquanbao for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. 
The annual reports provide the financial statements of the parent 
companies and the consolidated financial statements for the groups. 
Regarding the guidelines on the accounting method of the 
consolidated financial statements, we have relied on Ministry of 
Finance, PRC (1993; 1995; 1996). In 1995, there were a total of 323 
companies listed on the stock markets (188 in Shanghai and 135 in 
Shenzhen), and the data base covers 243 firms for the years of 1994 
and 1995.
Out of these 243 companies, we have identified 191 business 
groups which have at least one affiliated company. It might be that 
this definition of the business group is too broad, however, let us 
start with this broad definition. According to this distinction, the 
remaining 52 firms are considered as non-group firms. Based on this 
classification, we can tell that the business groups are the dominant 
form of business organization, at least among those listed on the 
stock market. Given that the listed companies are the best 
performing firms in China, this is important. As a matter of fact, the 
importance of the listed companies is increasing rapidly. For 
example, the market capitalization of the listed companies was 
approximately 8% of GDP in 1994, but increased to approximately 
25% of GDP in 1998.
As a next step, we have attempted to rank the 191 business 
groups in terms of their size measured in assets (Table 1). In this 
way, we have identified the top three business groups, the top 30 
business groups, and the remaining smaller business groups. 
Comparison of relative asset size show, firstly, that there is a large 
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TABLE 1






Top 3 3 1,591,688












D. Relative asset size ratio





Top 30 / Other groups 6.6 
Top 30 / Non-groups 5.4 
Other small groups / Non-groups 0.8 
Source: Authors' calculations using the database. See the text.
difference between the top three and the other business groups. The 
ratio between the top three and the top 4
th-30th is five to one. The 
asset size ratio between the top 30 and the remaining small business 
groups is even larger, 6.6 to one. The difference between the small 
business groups at the bottom and non-group firms, however, seems 
to be much smaller, with a ratio 0.8 to one (small business groups 
are smaller than non-group firms on average). Thus, at least in 
terms of size, one might say that these top 30 or so business groups 
would be more interesting cases to focus on. It should be noted, 
though, that smaller business groups tend to have almost equally 
large numbers of affiliated companies as the top 30 groups.
Table 2 shows that in the case of the top 30 groups, the average 
number of the affiliates included in the consolidated balance sheet 
(usually more than 50 % owned affiliate companies) is 9.63, which 
should not be taken as small, even when compared to Korean 
chaebols. The smaller business groups are shown to have, on 
average, 7.8 affiliated companies. This is also important since it 
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TABLE 2




























th No. of 
affiliates





10.806 7.806 5.45 2.84 3
Source: Authors' calculations using the database.
implies that, regardless of size, the Chinese listed companies prefer 
to take the form of business groups.
Table 3 compares the ownership structure of the listed firms in 
China. The table also suggests a significant difference between the 
top 30 business groups and others. In terms of the ratio of state 
shares, 42.9% is the average in the top 30, while in the small 
business groups it is only 26.5%, and 27% in non-group firms. The 
t-test results show a significant difference between the top 30 and 
the non-group firms. Thus, we first conclude that the big business 
groups in China tend to have substantially higher state shares than 
other firms. Furthermore, given our interests in big business groups, 
we can safely focus our analysis on top 30 groups, rather than cover 
all the business groups in China.
Table 4 compares the capital structure of the listed firms in China.  
It reveals a significant difference between the top 30 and the 
non-group firms. The top 30 groups tend to be more heavily indebted 
with a debt-equity ratio of 138.7%. However, the top three compared 
to non-group firms, have a debt-equity ratio of 86.9 percent. The 
t-test shows that this difference is significant, both in terms of the 
debt-equity ratio and the equity to asset ratio.
Table 5, comparing the profitability of the two sets of firms, shows 
that profitability differences are not that significant between the two 
groups. Before taxes and interests, profit to sales ratios are higher in 
the top 30 groups but the difference is not significant. The profit to 
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TABLE 3 
STRUCTURE OF OWNERSHIP IN BUSINESS GROUPS AND 








holding more than 1%
A. Business groups
Top 3 3 0.412 0.212 2
Top 30 30 0.429 0.23 3.033
Other 161 0.265 0.312 4.348
All 191 0.291 0.3 4.141
B. Non-group firms
52 0.27 0.347 3.673
C. All firms
243 0.287 0.31 4.041
D. t-test of the significance of the mean difference
Top 30 Non-group Significance
State share ratio 0.429 0.29 0.02
 Top 30 Non-group Significance
Legal person share ratio 0.23 0.35 0.07
TABLE 4 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN BUSINESS GROUPS AND 










Top 3 3 0.617 0.578 0.299
Top 30 30 0.497 1.387 0.224
Other 152 0.613 0.757 0.115
All 182 0.594 0.861 0.133
B. Non-group firms
49 0.587 0.869 0.139
C. All firms
231 0.592 0.862 0.134
D. t-test of the significance of the mean difference
Top 30 Non-group t-statistics Significance
   Equity/Asset ratio 0.497 0.587 -2.21 0.031
 
Top 30 Non-group t-statistics Significance
   Debt/Equity ratio 1.387 0.869 2.25 0.03
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TABLE 5 
PROFITABILITY IN BUSINESS GROUPS AND NON-GROUP FIRMS IN CHINA
No. of sample 
firms in this 
category
Profits Profit/Sales Profit/Equity Profit/Asset
 A. Business groups
 Top 3 3 107,269 0.103 0.111 0.069
 Top 30 30 25,085 0.575 0.13 0.055
 Other 152 4,020 0.464 0.094 0.057
 All 182 7,493 0.483 0.1 0.056
 B. Non-group firms
49 7,329 0.175 0.133 0.076
 C. All firms
231 7,457 0.413 0.107 0.061
 D. t-test of the significance of the mean difference
Top 30 Non-group t-statistics Significance
     Profit/Sales 0.575 0.175 1.12 0.27
Top 30 Non-group t-statistics Significance
     Profit/Equity 0.13 0.133 -0.08 0.94
Top 30 Non-group t-statistics Significance
     Profit/Asset 0.055 0.076 -1.82 0.07
equity ratio is 13% in the top 30 groups and 13.3% in the non-group 
firms, and the difference is not significant. Only the difference in 
terms of profit to asset ratio appears marginally significant at the ten 
percent level with the ratio of 5.5% in the top 30 groups and 7.6% 
percent in non-group firms.
Table 6 compares growth rates of sales, equity capital and total 
assets. Except in sales growth where the difference is negligible, 
non-group firms are shown to have increased both equity capital and 
total assets faster than the top 30 groups. The growth rate 
differences should be regarded as substantial as the asset growth 
rate of the non-group firms is 32% compared to 14.6% in the top 30 
groups. In terms of growth in equity capital, the difference is 32.8% 
vs. 8.5%. 
We can summarize the results of the above comparisons as 
follows. The comparisons suggest that the big business groups in 
China tend to have more state shares, be more heavily indebted, are 
less profitable, and accumulate capital more slowly than non-group 
firms. In summary, big business groups in China seem to be quite  
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TABLE 6 
GROWTH PROPENSITY IN BUSINESS GROUPS AND NON-GROUP FIRMS 







 A. Business groups
 Top 3 3 0.113 0.161
 Top 30 30 0.146 0.085
 Other 151 0.166 0.17
 All 181 0.163 0.156
 B. Non-group firms
47 0.32 0.328
 C. All firms
228 0.195 0.191
 D. t-test of the significance of the mean difference
    (Top 28 groups vs. Non-group firms)
Top 28 Non-group t-statistics Significance
Sales -0.04874 -0.1013164 0.71 0.48
Top 30 Non-group t-statistics Significance
Assets 0.145684 0.32007193 -2.5599 0.013
Top 30 Non-group t-statistics Significance
Equity capital 0.08469 0.32797698 -2.313 0.0247
 
different from, or in some sense inferior to, non-group firms in these 
respects.
IV. Asset Diversions and the Four Types of Business Groups
In this section, we discuss the business groups formed via 
spin-offs or joint ventures. For this purpose, we have selected 118 
companies for 1994, and 168 companies for 1995 and 1996. They 
are selected according to some criteria out of the 191 listed business 
groups in our data base.3 We have classified the sample enterprises 
3
Only those enterprises satisfying the following three criteria are selected. 
First, the required information is available for all three years. Second, as at 
the end of 1996, the amount of long-term investment conducted by the 
parent company is greater than 10% of total assets of the parent company. 
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into four types according to the following two criteria: 
The first criterion is the ratio of long-term investment (into their 
affiliate companies) to total asset. The long-term investment contains 
the listed parent company’s long-term equity investment and 
long-term debt investment to the affiliations. According to Tenev and 
Zhang (2002) and Meyer and Lu (2004), diverse forms of agency 
costs are serious in the listed companies in China, and long-term 
investment or loans from the listed to unlisted subsidiaries are often 
used as channels for tunneling or asset stripping. Numerous 
anecdotes have suggested that controlling shareholders treat listed 
firms as cash machines, from which they can withdraw money for as 
long as they wish, and the managers want to gain further autonomy 
from their supervising agencies by breaking up existing enterprises 
to form subsidiaries, joint ventures with foreign or domestic 
partners.
If this ratio of long-term investment is 1, then it means that the 
company is a pure holding company. In other words, the higher the 
long-term investment ratio (LIR) is, the closer to a pure holding 
company a company is. For 1994-96 period, the average LIR was 0.3 
for the sample companies we have chosen.
The second criterion is the relative importance (weight) of business 
income of the parent company in the whole group. This variable, 
relative business income ratio (RBIR), is measured by the following 
formula.
 
RBIR (relative business income ratio)＝A/B, 
where A＝(parent’s business income)/(business income of group 
total), 
and B＝(parent’s total assets－long-term investment)/(group’s total 
assets－long-term investment). 
In other words, the relative business income ratio (RBIR) is defined 
as the ratio of weight of business income of the parent company to 
the weight of operating assets of the parent company. This variable 
aims to reflect the degree to which the parent company is making 
money from its own business rather than from those of subsidiaries. 
Therefore, we can say that the lower the RBIR is, the closer to a 
Third, as at the end of 1996, the number of the subsidiaries included in the 
consolidated financial statements is greater than or equal to 4.
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pure holding company a company is. For the 1994-96 period, the 
average RBIR was 0.65 for the sample of the listed companies.
Now, using the two criteria (LIR and RBIR), we have classified the 
listed companies into the following four types: pure holding 
companies, business holding companies, hybrid parent companies, 
and business parent companies (See Figure 1). The companies are 
classified into pure or business holding companies if the long-term 
investment ratio (LIR) is greater than 0.7.4 The companies are 
classified into business parents or business holding companies if the 
relative business income ratio is greater than 0.65, the average for 
the whole groups. For simplicity, classification criteria can be 
summarized in the figure below.
Type I is a ‘pure holding company’ which has a very high long- 
term investment ratio and a lower than average business income 
ratio. Examples include: Tianjin Bohai Chemical Industry (Group), 
Northeast Electrical Transmission & Transformation Machinery 
Manufacturing, Shantou Electric Power Development, Kunming 
Wuhua Industry (Group). 
Type IV is the opposite of Type I, and is a parent company with its 
own business income ratio higher than the average and low to 
medium long-term investment ratio. We call this a ‘business parent 
company’, with such examples as the SVA and Shanghai Electrical 
Apparatus Co. The remaining two types (Types II and III) are a mix 
of types between the two extremes of a pure holding and a business 
parent company. Type II is called a ‘business holding company’, 
which is characterized by a very high long-term investment ratio and 
a higher than average business income ratio. This type of company 
owns a substantial share in their subsidiaries, but simultaneously 
conducts much of its own business. In this sense, it is an odd 
combination, and subsequently, there are very few companies 
belonging to this category.
A more controversial case we are going to focus on is Type III, a 
‘hybrid parent company’. Examples include: Jiangling Motors, 
Shenzhen Petrochemical Industry (Group), Huayuan Industrial 
4
Of course, the criterion of 0.7 is arbitrary. Actually, we have tried several 
values, ranging from 0.5 to 0.9, however, the choice does not change the 
basic results. We decided, therefore, that to be called a pure holding 
company the ratio of long-term investment should be at least higher than 0.7 
although the average ratio of long-term investment for the whole sample in 
1996 is as low as 0.4.
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Part A: Classification Method












Notes: 1) Relative Long-Term Investment ＝ (long-term investment)/(total asset)
Note:  2) Relative Business Income ＝ Weight of business income of parent 
company relative to weight of business asset of parent company 
(simply, relative weight of parent business income) ＝ A/B 
    where A ＝ (parent business income)/(business income of group total)  
B ＝ (parent’s total assets － long-term investment) 
            /(group’s total assets － long-term investment)
Part B: Examples of the Firms in Each Category
(The firms listed below had belonged to each category in all three years)
I. Pure Holding Co.: Tianjin Bohai Chemical Industry (Group), Northeast 
Electrical Transmission & Transformation Machinery Manufacturing, 
Shantou Electric Power Development, Kunming Wuhua Industry (Group)
II. Business Holding Co.: None
III. Hybrid Parent Co.: Jiangling Motors, Shenzhen Petrochemical Industry 
(Group), Huayuan Industrial (Group), China Baoan Group, Wanke Group, 
Guangdong Midea Group, China Kejian, etc. 
IV. Business Parent Co.: SVA, Shanghai Electrical Apparatus, etc.
FIGURE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF THE ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN CHINA
(Group), China Baoan Group, Wanke Group, Guangdong Midea 
Group, China Kejian, and so on. It, too, is an odd combination since 
it does not have substantial long-term investment over its sub- 
sidiaries, as does a pure holding company and, at the same time, 
does not have much of its own business income. An interesting and 
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TABLE 7A 
TYPES OF ENTERPRISE GROUPS IN CHINA (ASSET VALUES: 10,000 YUAN)
Types
1994 1995 1996
Number Asset Values Number Asset Values Number Asset Values
I 7 570,874 4 377,420 4 522,488
Pure Holding Co. 5.93% 5.46% 2.38% 2.53% 2.38% 3.09%
II 
0 0 0 0 0 0
Business Holding Co.
III 36 2,903,386 76 6,136,911 82 7,863,361
Hybrid Parent Co. 30.51% 27.75% 45.24% 41.20% 48.81% 46.48%
IV 75 6,987,885 88 8,381,885 82 8,531,183
Business Parent Co. 63.56% 66.79% 52.38% 56.27% 48.81% 50.43%
Total
118 10,462,145 168 14,896,216 168 16,917,032
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
important fact is that in terms of numbers, many of this type of 
company exist and their numbers are increasing rapidly in both 
absolute numbers and relative shares. Before going into more detail 
on this type of company, however, let us first discuss the overall 
picture of the typology. Figure 1 presents the basic typology of the 
business groups in China.
According to Table 7A, business parent companies, the most 
traditional form, are the largest in number. However, their relative 
importance has been decreasing over the years. In contrast, Type III 
companies, hybrid parent companies, are increasing rapidly in both 
absolute and relative terms. One of the important hypotheses we 
propose is that the traditional parent companies are converting to this 
hybrid form as their own business incomes are decreasing. The 
second important and related hypothesis is that many of the current 
hybrid form parent companies are actually similar to pure holding 
companies in that the actual, not accounting, values of their 
long-term investments are much higher than shown in the 
accounting books. Both of these hypotheses are consistent with the 
common interpretation that many parent companies are diverting 
their assets to the benefits of subsidiaries in diverse irregular 
manner; and that the motivation for this type of behavior is to 
bypass state regulations in order to increase company benefits at the 
expense of the state as both tax collector and major shareholder. Let 
us focus on this issue below.
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TABLE 7B 




Number Asset Values Number Asset Values Number Asset Values
I 16 1,446,274 17 1,938,567 12 1,477,062
Pure Holding Co. 13.56% 13.82% 10.12% 13.01% 7.14% 8.73%
II 0 0 1   31,270 0 0
Business Holding Co. 0.60% 0.20%
III 27 2,027,986 61 4,511,913 74  6,908,787 
Hybrid Parent Co. 22.88% 19.38% 36.31% 30.29% 44.05% 40.84%
IV 75 6,987,885 89 8,414,466 82 8,531,183
Business Parent Co. 63.56% 66.79% 52.98% 56.49% 48.81% 50.43%
Total
118 10,462,245 168 14,896,216 168 16,917,032
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 
In many of the hybrid parent company cases, the long-term 
investment is low only in the accounting books. In reality, much of 
the fixed or variable assets are used for business activities of 
subsidiaries in somewhat irregular ways. An investigation of the 
balance sheets shows that there are many arbitrary items such as 
‘unrealized receivable from related companies’ and ‘internal 
transactions’ within the category of variable assets. The amounts 
listed under these items are de facto long-term investments which 
are being utilized by subsidiary companies.5 The number of 
companies that have made up such items in their balance sheets 
was 24 in 1994, 36 in 1995, and 30 in 1996, most of which are 
hybrid parent companies. Table 7B is a new classification after those 
arbitrary items to long-term investments are added.
The number of pure holding companies increased more or less 
substantially after this adjustment for arbitrary items was made. For 
example, in 1995 there were only four pure holding companies before 
adjustment, but the number increased to 17 after adjustment. The 
relative share of pure holding companies has also increased after the 
adjustment. The tendency of both absolute and relative increases of 
shares in hybrid companies, and the tendency of decrease in the 
share of the business parent companies, remains valid after the 
5 We were able to confirm this by personal interviews of enterprise 
personnel and stock market staff.
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adjustment. The importance of hybrid companies, measured in 
relative share in number, has increased from 22.9% in 1994 to 
36.3% in 1995, and finally to 44.1% in 1996.
The next question addressed is the nature of this hybrid form of 
parent company. Initially, they are difficult to understand because 
they show low long-term investment figures while their own business 
incomes are relatively small. A plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon could be that many of the hybrid companies are 
diverting their assets for utilization by their subsidiaries without 
reporting it in the balance sheets. This interpretation is consistent 
with the fact that whereas the average long-term investment ratios 
are quite stable over the three-year period, the average ratio of 
relative business income is rapidly decreasing. This strategy was to 
bypass the restriction in Clause 12 of the Enterprise Law that 
prohibited a company from placing greater than 50% of its net assets 
in long term investments into other companies, with the exception of 
investment companies or pure holding companies approved by the 
State Council. 
In our sample, the number and share of the companies violating 
this restriction amounted to 54 and 45.7% in 1994, 77 and 45.8% in 
1995, and 79 and 47% in 1996. Of course, many companies with 
lower than 50% long-term investment ratios would actually be 
helping subsidiaries in the form of diverse, disguised, long-term 
investment without even reporting it in the balance sheets. This 
poses a serious problem for any rigorous economic analysis. For 
example, we cannot attempt any serious comparison of economic 
efficiency among the different types of groups, given that the 
classification does not fully reflect the true type of the firms. 
Therefore, we are not doing any rigorous test of any statistical 
significance in this section, but are stopping at identifying several 
plausible hypotheses and related tendencies.
To examine the hypothesis that business parent companies are 
being changed into hybrid parent companies, we have checked each 
case of business group to learn if it is actually happening. Table 8 
shows the results. First, over the 1994 to 1995 period, out of a total 
of 18 companies that changed their type, the majority, ten, have 
changed from business parent to hybrid parent. Over the 1995 to 
1996 period, out of a total of 23 companies that changed their type, 
14 companies have changed from business parent to hybrid parent. 
There are, in fact, diverse patterns of type changes for various  
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TABLE 8
CHANGES OF THE GROUP TYPES
 A. Change over the 1994-95 period (from 1994 to 1995)
1994 Type
1995 Type





 B. Change over the 1995-96 period (from 1995 to 1996)
1995 Type
1996 Type





reasons and for data ambiguity problems. However, it seems 
reasonable to interpret that in more than the majority of cases, the 
change is from business parent to hybrid parent, although we 
cannot claim statistical significance of the difference.6
As discussed in Section II, pooling of capital to increase size is one 
of the main reasons for the formation of business groups. Pooling of 
capital not only increases the size of the company, but is also 
accompanied by new technology, both of which are important in 
meeting market competition. In this case, group formation occurs 
when a parent company sets up a new company, combining its own 
funds with funds from other companies.
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks
An increasing number of Chinese companies have been taking the 
form of business groups. This paper first shows that big business 
groups in China tend to have more state shares, be more heavily 
6
Out of a total of 18 type changes over the 1994-95 period, there are three 
cases of the reverse change; and out of a total of 23 cases of type changes 
over the 1995-96 period, there are seven cases of the opposite direction 
change.
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indebted, are less profitable, and accumulate capital more slowly 
than non-group firms. The emergence of business groups appears to 
have been a response to increasing market competition in the 
plan-constrained environment. Forming a group, with the apparent 
effect of higher visibility, acted like a signaling device during the 
half-fledged nature of the capital market in China in the 1990s. It 
was also an outcome of entry into new profitable business fields by 
the existing companies because exit from old business fields was 
difficult due to institutional constraints. These constraints included 
social functions attached to the old businesses, such as job 
provision. Entry or expansion into new business fields were often 
accompanied by implicit or explicit asset diversion from old to new 
business fields, conducted by new spin-off firms.
This paper suggests evidence, albeit not conclusive, that asset 
diversion tended to lead to the creation of hybrid parent companies 
out of the traditional parent companies. The net effect of this type of 
asset diversion was dubious because it might have been associated 
with asset stripping and/or information hiding from the supervisory 
state agency by adding another layer to the firms. These hybrid form 
business groups are characterized by low long-term investment ratios 
and low weight of business incomes of the parent companies relative 
to that of the whole group. When irregular long-term investment into 
subsidiaries is taken into account, some of the hybrid parent firms 
turn out to be more similar to pure holding companies with high 
long-term investment ratios and little business income of their own.
This paper should be regarded as an attempt to understand the 
reasons for the emergence of business groups in China. Evidence 
provided here cannot claim full authority; however, this paper has at 
least succeeded in identifying several important aspects of business 
behavior which can be a basis for further analysis and policy 
formulations. First, business groups, although initiated originally by 
the government, had a rationale to emerge in the Chinese economy 
in the 1990s. Second, despite more state-owned and less dynamic 
big business groups, there exist many dynamic, small and medium 
sized business groups which have emerged voluntarily and have the 
potential to become main players in the future Chinese economy. 
Third, given the very competitive nature of Chinese markets, 
compared to early Korean and Japanese markets of oligopolistic 
nature, the Chinese business groups cannot afford to diversify into 
many unrelated fields (Lee and Woo 2002). Fourth, given the 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS502
transitional nature of the Chinese economy and that the related 
market failure and/or plan constraints will continue to exist for a 
while, we will see more and more business groups emerging from the 
organizational changes of the old state-owned companies. Fifth, this 
change then gives the central government a policy challenge in 
dealing with business groups in terms of taxation and monitoring 
over these business practices.
(Received 14 July 2007; Revised 27 November 2007)
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